Introduction
The first, and current, National Security Strategy (NSS) of the Republic of the infrastructure capability to perform its functions were among the most important instruments of their operating concept. Apparently, the Russian objectives were directed at undermining the country's ability to resist the potential aggressor. The Ukrainian example also demonstrated that malicious acts against the key societal functions and critical infrastructure could become a very powerful tool of the state actor, not only the nonstate actors, as was the case before. Damage to the critical infrastructure aimed at deteriorating living conditions may, under favourable conditions, force the attacked country to submit to the aggressor, allowing it to achieve its political goals. The Ukraine crisis revealed that the time for complacency, even for NATO members, is over and that the political and military power of the Alliance is being challenged by behaviour that sneaks under the threshold of activation of collective defence mechanisms (e.g. North Atlantic Treaty Article 5), primarily exploiting state and societal vulnerabilities.
Being a complex phenomenon, hybrid warfare and related concepts represent the types of threat that require a holistic approach in conceptualization, planning, organizing and exercising the response to them. The developers of a national security strategy, in designing their models, should recognize the paradigmatic changes in the security environment and the objects of what should be protected (i.e. secured) and how. We also propose use of the systems approach (systems thinking), which is useful in handling the complexity that Croatia's national security is facing and will face in the coming period. Systems thinking may help in approaching national security holistically, focusing more on reducing one's own vulnerabilities.
While the traditional elements of state power remain relevant, the smaller states, like Croatia, even under the umbrella of NATO or as a member of the EU, have to increase their immunity. We argue that, no matter who the adversary could be, revisionist or rival state(s), state or non-state actors, the most efficient national defence measures should include a reduction of societal vulnerabilities. Societal resilience arguably represents one of the most efficient ways to prevent hybrid threats from being effective.
Societal resilience has recently been recognized in many countries (Cederberg and Eronen 2015a) , as well in NATO and the EU, as the key factor for mitigating societal vulnerabilities.
Theoretical framework
In the following sections, we analyse the notion of national security and the hybrid warfare concept with related terms. After that, we examine implications of the hybrid threat environment for Croatia's national security. We also address some of Croatia's widely recognized weaknesses that should be taken into consideration in any key security and defence strategy threat assessment. Finally, we propose ways to counter hybrid threats, including an expanded approach to strategic planning and the concept of societal resilience.
The national security
Alan Stolberg (2012: 12) found that different nations have different perspectives on what national security is, which are largely inherent in the respective strategic culture of each nation state. Stolberg explains that "the combination of national interests with strategic culture, and a country's understanding of what its security concerns should be, leads to the identification of what the idea of national security will mean for an individual nation-state member of the international system". Finally, the association of the terms "national" and "security" with the concept of strategy will give the national security most of its relevance.
According to George Kennan 3 (1948), as cited in Ikenberry and Slaughter (2006: 14) , national security is "the continued ability of the country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers." This kind of perspective was very influential, particularly among the real politics scholars, until the end of the Cold War period, more precisely until the end of the 1990s. The state and its defence from external threats was amongst the highest priorities (or "ends") of most national security strategies at the time. In general, it may be said that national security strategies substantially represented a "nation's plan for the coordinated use of all the instruments of state power-non-military as well as military-to pursue objectives that defend and advance its national interest" (Doyle 2007: 624) . Arnold Wolfers (1952) makes a distinction between security in an "objective sense", as the absence of threats, and in a "subjective sense", as the absence of fear.
He argues that security is achieved once both components exist. Some scholars in Croatia argue that the most important aspect of national security is that it represents a precondition for social and economic development (Bilandžić 2015 .
Besides the state security, national security encompasses functions and institutions. 4 In general, security institutions have to evolve and to be transformed to be able to ensure the state's function to provide security.
In the USA, for instance, the most obvious paradigm change related to the security apparatus after the Cold War happened with the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack and the subsequent anthrax mailings on US soil. These events changed the United States' calculus of national interests and led to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (Newmann 2002 ). The changed post-Cold War security environment, with new threats and challenges, necessitated an additional focus on internal security, consequently involving the crisis management concept. As the threats became more challenging, the response model started to evolve from the departmental towards the interagency model.
Threats and challenges recognized recently as "hybrid" represent an additional challenge in the approach to national security, expanding it to societal (MoD Finland 2010) and human security.
The hybrid warfare concept
Hybrid threats, hybrid operations, hybrid warfare, ambiguous warfare, non-linear warfare, shadow war or grey-zone wars 5 are just some of the recently formulated expressions related to the hybrid warfare topic. In the broader literature, the concept of hybrid warfare is often the subject of semantic debate. We will employ the term "hybrid" and the ordinary or a theory of warfare." We also adopt the term "hybrid adversary" for an actor applying the hybrid warfare concept and "hybrid threats" as potential actors and trends that exist in the security environment before the hybrid warfare concept is applied (which is more an act).
We dedicate the following sections to discussing some important questions related to the hybrid warfare concept.
Does the hybrid warfare concept represent a new type of warfare?
Contrary to some claims (Barno 2013 (Barno , 2014 Cederberg and Eronen 2015b) information may be disseminated by means of television stations, websites/ web portals or social media groups and may even include leafleting to the home address.
Another characteristic that represents novelty is the coordinated use of all instruments of state power at low levels, which also accounts for a general improvement. In the case of Russia, the instruments of state power have been used comprehensively, focusing on different domains, sequentially or at the same time.
What is the role of Russia in relation to the hybrid warfare concept?
Hybrid warfare does not exist as an institutionalized concept in either Russia or the West. We adopt the thesis that hybrid warfare is not a Russiangenerated theory of warfare and it is worth mentioning that Russian decision-makers claim that they adapted their capabilities to Western behaviour in international relations (Gerasimov 2013; Bartles 2016 ).
Even though a discernible pattern of its characteristics exist, the hybrid warfare concept should rather be seen as a set of principles, methods and tools, prioritized and, when possible, integrated, skilfully applied to achieve political objectives without escalating into armed conflict. We argue that our (i.e. Western) struggle to describe the hybrid warfare concept lies in the fact that Russian foreign policy behaviour since 2014
represents a certain strategic surprise to our legal norms and capabilities.
This surprise also stems from a complacency in our (i.e. the Euro-Atlantic region) economic and military power which, arguably, has not had the desired deterrent effect.
Therefore, when we talk about the hybrid warfare concept, we must be tolerant and willing to cope with a very fluid, changing and transformative theme. The concept, of course, challenges our judgement and perception and should not be underestimated just because, once emerged, it
looks similar to what we have seen before. It is particularly important to approach assessment of the hybrid warfare threat properly in the national security strategy as it has a profound impact on ways (usually the need for an integrated, whole of the government approach) and means (that also go beyond the purely military but affect armed forces in terms of their agility, responsiveness and level of integration with other instruments of state power).
To properly approach the hybrid warfare concept, it is extremely important to assess a threat actor within that actor's own context. To this end, it is critical that the analysis of hybrid warfare's characteristics in the context of the Russo-Ukraine conflict and Russia's foreign policy behaviour in general is grounded on a deep understanding of the historical context
Nevertheless, a strategic foresight analysis, which is a part of NSS development, must consider hybrid warfare in a more general perspective.
A good example of this is the report by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (Conley et al. 2016 ) which provides key findings on Russia's influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Their findings may be used as the basic elements to describe Russia's foreign policy behaviour related to the use of hybrid warfare methods.
• "Russia has cultivated an opaque network of patronage across the region that it uses to influence and direct decision-making", a web that "resembles a network flow model", which the authors call an "unvirtuous cycle of the Russian influence".
• "Corruption is the lubricant […] concentrating on the exploitation of state resources to further Russia's networks of influence".
• The networks constitute the vital element of Russia's doctrine which is primarily a "strategy of influence, not of brute force," aimed at "breaking the internal coherence of the enemy system-and not about its integral annihilation" (Conley et al. 2016: X) .
Obviously, the methods described above focus primarily on societal vulnerabilities (e.g. governance, internal conflicts, socially divided society, lack of political consensus on the future of the society, corruption, inefficient law enforcement, lack of natural resources and energy dependency on foreign states, etc.). This aspect seems to be the most important element in distinguishing this type of warfare from the more traditional, where a territory and a battle (i.e. war fighting) are the main paradigm. The
Ukraine crisis therefore brought a new dimension to understanding the hybrid warfare concept: during the crisis, the non-coercive dimension of the concept emerged as preponderant while the hard (kinetic) power (i.e. armed forces) was used primarily as a means of threat.
It has to be emphasized that Russia is not the only actor in contemporary international relations that uses hybrid warfare methods. Similar examples, to a certain extent, may be seen in China's behaviour in the South China Sea or ISIL's ability to mobilize people with a fractured identity. However,
Russian foreign policy behaviour comprises most of what the broadest
understanding of the hybrid warfare concept contains.
How to define the hybrid warfare concept?
Even though we agree that any attempt to create a strict definition of hybrid warfare may create a risk of not encompassing it comprehensively, doing that is still useful, at least to ensure that the concept is comprehended beyond its purely military or defence dimension.
The NATO STO (2017) Research Specialist Team 6 (RST) determined that there was little value in looking at the definition of hybrid warfare as part of its work. The RST rather decided that the greatest value would come from focusing on understanding the modalities of Russian and Russiansponsored activities against Ukraine.
The fact is that the definitions and our understanding of the concept evolve as we reveal its characteristics. Before the Ukraine crisis, hybrid warfare was mostly described as conflict comprising a combination of conventional and asymmetric means of violence. This approach apparently did not go beyond the tactical and operational perspective, let alone include society and its economy, critical infrastructure and other instruments of the state power. Peter R. Mansoor describes hybrid warfare as "conflict involving military forces and irregulars (guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists), which could include both state and non-state actors aimed at achieving a common political goal" (Mansoor 2012: 2) . The primary trigger for a 6 The RST comprised researchers from nine NATO and partners' nations and the research was conducted in partnership with the Ukraine National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS).
renewed discussion on the character of this concept was actually Russia's engagement in the Ukraine crisis (Giles et al. 2015) . "Hybrid threats can be characterized as a mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological, information), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of open organized hostilities. There is usually an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target and on generating ambiguity with the intention to hinder decision-making processes.
Massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalize, recruit and direct proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats" (EC 2016: 4).
Definitions of the hybrid warfare concept related to the Ukraine crisis are not the only ones that exist. One of the most comprehensive descriptions of such warfare in the age of globalization was made by two Chinese senior colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, in 1999. Their main argument was that warfare in the modern world would no longer be primarily a struggle defined by military means; even more, it may not involve the military at all. Liang and Xiangsui (1999: 7) acknowledged the new principles of war that were no longer about "using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one's will" but rather were "using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and nonlethal means to compel the enemy to accept one's interests".
The concept labelled as hybrid warfare is therefore neither entirely new nor as old or known as some authors claim. However, many of the existing definitions, especially those articulated before 2014, lack comprehensiveness that goes beyond the military domain (i.e. beyond an attempt to describe it as warfare).
Implications of hybrid threat context for Croatia's national security
Arguably, hybrid warfare methods are a reality and are in use by adversaries in shaping the contemporary security environment. From the NATO members' perspective, they are closely connected to Russian foreign policy behaviour (NATO 2016) . 7 Consequently, the question worth answering is how does the fact that hybrid warfare is a reality affects Croatia's national security?
Croatia's regional security environment and the role of Russia
Although we are not able to produce a reliable intelligence report related to potential or specific activities of Russia against the Republic of Croatia,
some information from open sources may help to create a relatively sound perspective on it.
In an interview with Defense News ( Apparently, Croatia is not perceived by its highest political levels, at least officially, as a target itself but is rather seen as part of a bigger puzzle in which regional instability may have significant implications for Croatia's national security. We assume that it is reasonable to believe that the main issues in relations between the West and Russia are not only developments in Ukraine but lie in "the international status and socio-political system of Russia" (Kreutz 2015: 67 and threats (SWOT analysis) of the Republic of Croatia related to its national security. A particular emphasis in this assessment was given to societal vulnerabilities in Croatia that are usually not taken seriously into consideration during the development of a threat assessment.
Strengths

• Membership of NATO and EU
• Relatively high level of national cohesion (no ethnic/separatists, extremists or other tensions)
• Capable armed forces and law enforcement system
Weaknesses
• Lack of appropriate interagency (inter-sectorial) cooperation at national level (including crisis management)
• Lack of legal and political means for addressing hybrid warfare
• Armed forces entirely dependent on professionals (reserve forces not adequately maintained for force augmentation in terms of personnel and capability)
• Inadequate and insufficient legal and doctrinal basis to counter hybrid strategies
• Negative demographic trends (ageing, depopulation, emigration of the active working population of Croatia to other, more prosperous EU countries)
• Low national economic performance 9 resulting in growing social inequalities
• Unsustainable public finances, including excessive dependence of the population on state transfers, which consequently exaggerate government spending (Buric and Stulhofer 2016; Lausic 2017) • Low effectiveness of the legal system
10
• Political clientelism (crony capitalism) and systemic political corruption (Bilandžić 2015) 9 The Bloomberg prediction "Meet 2016's Worst Economic Performers", puts Croatia in a group of the ten worst performing economies in 2016 (Tartar et al. 2016) . The fact that Japan, Finland and Switzerland are in the same group may sound soothing but doesn't change the fact that the Croatian economy is far from being exemplary.
• High level of energy import dependency The above assessment shows that, aside from external conditions (the global and regional security environment), Croatia's internal challenges also give cause for concern. Although NATO membership provides an essential deterrent capability against conventional threats, NATO's Warsaw Summit Declaration states that "the primary responsibility to respond to hybrid threats or attacks rests with the targeted nation"
(NATO 2016: para.72). However, the Declaration promises that "NATO is prepared to assist an Ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign". The hybrid threats and attacks apparently do not fit automatically under NATO's collective defence umbrella. This kind of uncertainty has led many small 11 Croatia imports 72 per cent of its energy consumption; most of it (91 per cent) refers to fossil fuels (Matutinovic 2014) .
12 NATO uses this term in describing the strategic military perspectives, including the impact of geopolitical trends on security environment, referring to "Spill over of conflict from neighbouring countries along NATO borders, interstate conflict over access to resources, state-on-state conflict including Article V situations, resource wars, frozen conflict, new spheres of influence" (NATO ACT 2015: 15).
NATO countries, particularly those at the northern and southern "vignette" of the European continent, closer to Russia geographically, to put an additional focus on deterrence measures. The issue is, and it is generally acknowledged, that neither all adversaries nor all types of threat may be deterred by employing traditional deterrence strategies. This is particularly the case with non-state actors (Clarke, Gearson and Shaud 2009: 295-297) . Deterrence depends upon psychological effects and must fulfil three criteria: capability, commitment and communication (Lonsdale 2008: 50) . Considering Russia as a potential threat, some Scandinavian countries (e.g. Norway, Sweden and Finland), joined by Estonia, started developing the threshold concept, which is conceptualized under the premise of denying the aggressor the ability to achieve its goals swiftly and at low cost (i.e. before NATO's Article V has been activated). In a multinational alliance context, the threshold is considered the deterrence which the national armed forces in place provide. In this view, the sum of 
Ways to counter hybrid threats
The organization of a robust national defence to cope with hybrid threats requires a different approach from the current traditional one to deal with more or less conventional and asymmetric threats that comprise an armed attack or/and armed conflict. The instabilities in which hybrid warfare principles are implemented show the inadequacy of the military as a particular instrument of national power able to respond to them.
"In hybrid conflicts, armed forces are not a primary tool to exert military force: they rather serve as a means to create a scenario of intimidation. The idea of war as a struggle between two armies does not apply here. Consequently, military responses exercised by NATO forces are not the first or most appropriate security policy tool" (Major and Mölling 2015: 1) .
Military organization as an instrument of the national power should, therefore, be seen more and more as a means that has to be integrated with other instruments of power to respond adequately to challenges stemming from the hybrid warfare concept. We argue that the concept of ways of responding to hybrid threats should comprise, at least, a continuous process of assessment of the vulnerability of national security (including the vulnerability of the vital societal functions):
Design of the processes and systems of the early warning, its setup and maintenance, based on an integrated (i.e. an inter-sectorial, a whole of government) approach.
Sustainability principles and practices in all three aspects (economic, social and environmental) implemented in the state's key policy and strategic documents to provide societal "immunity".
Societal resilience developed and supported as a higher level of defence to ensure effective and efficient response to hybrid threats, as well as threats and challenges that usually belong to the scope of crisis management.
An integrated model of using/sharing all national capabilities-all available forces and the means to employ them efficiently and rationally.
The recommendations above require careful strategic planning and coordinated efforts on a societal level to be implemented successfully.
Strategic planning in the contemporary security environment
The traditional approach to strategic planning considers an organization through a set of fixed interests (goals, objectives) juxtaposed against a fixed environment (the world or a set of external conditions). This approach then assumes the development of a strategy for attaining the interests subject to the constraints of the fixed environment (Ascher and Overholt 1983: 6) .
In international politics, strategy is usually perceived as "a comprehensive way to try to pursue political ends, including the threat or actual use of force, in a dialectic of wills" (Heuser 2010: 27) . This approach, however, orients the focus of strategy planning exclusively outwards and assumes the use of force as the exclusive means. The changing trends have already been recognized and some new approaches proposed: see, for example, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) regarding securitization and the concept of extended sectors of security.
In the complex security environment (Wijkman 2015) , neither the environment itself nor the internal state of an organization (a nation) is fixed and static. More importantly-and this specifically matters in the hybrid threat context-the internal state (the strength, cohesion vs vulnerabilities, etc.) directly relates to the ability to affect the environment, either in shaping it or in countering threats and dealing with disturbances.
As the NATO STO (2017: 20) RST's final report suggests, "it can be argued that when facing a competent hybrid threat actor, once the problem is recognized it is too late." Therefore, it is important to be able to recognize i.e. 2002-2017) between the two national security strategies suggests that an advanced strategic culture, as well as strategy and policy development capacity, has yet to be built.
Systems approach 13
The more complex our environment is, the more indicators we have to watch to ensure we can have an appropriate answer to disturbances.
Indicators link us to the world, since only by reading the right indicators can we cope with our dynamic environment (that is, be situationally aware). Indicators are also helpful in constructing an image of the state of our environment on which we can make a reliable decision to protect and promote what we hold dear.
13 In its most basic definition, a systems approach is "a line of thought in the management field which stresses the interactive nature and interdependence of external and internal factors in an organization" (WebFinance Inc. 2017).
Hartmut Bossel (1996) argues that there are two basic sets of indicators needed for the system to cope with the challenges from the environment, determined by:
1. The system itself (the current state of the system).
2. The interests, needs, or objectives of the operator or observer.
Arguably, the majority of national security strategies are focused on the second set (pursuing political ends), while the first (the system itself) is usually considered and analysed only regarding its capacity to achieve the ends described in the second. In fact, the first set should also comprise an assessment of the system itself, through the perspective of addressing vulnerabilities and weaknesses. We therefore propose the systems approach in designing and executing national strategic planning, which should encompass both sets of indicators. The systems approach (systems thinking) may arguably be very useful in handling the complexity facing nations and the world in the coming decades (Arnold and Wade 2015) .
The systems approach, in this context, enables the integration of ways and means, as well as internal and external environment of a state and society.
The role of society and societal resilience in defending against hybrid threats
In the hybrid threat environment, a society is, at the same time, an object of aggression and a force that counters aggression. As an object of aggression, it may be exposed to powerful informational, psychological, cultural and other aggressor influences. The aggressor can pursue its goals through influences, manipulation of public perception and destructive processes (supporting identity projects of a particular part of the population, inciting separatism and extremism, and/or provoking political and social destabilization) in the country attacked. Besides the cognitive and affective domain, an adversary may well intend to exploit existing socio-economic inequalities that lead to further social disruptions.
Corruption of dependencies on the import of commodities and energy-generating products may also be a source of societal vulnerability. It is therefore critical to identify the causes of the state's weaknesses and to implement policies to improve the situation to decrease negative impacts and develop ways to enhance resistance of such influences in various fields. This contributes to societal resilience against threats and challenges coming from the security environment, particularly against hybrid threats.
In general, as defined by Markus Keck and Patrick Sakdapolrak (2013) , societal resilience comprises three capacities: coping, adaptive and transformative. Societal resilience tends to ensure that society can face and quickly recover from any disturbance and crisis.
Most definitions of resilience outline one or more perspectives, but comprise in general reactive recovery (e.g. the cyber-attack) and/or stability after traumatic events (e.g. natural disaster). We chose the description from Zebrowski (2016: 4) as the starting point: "At its most general level, resilience is understood as the capacity to absorb, withstand and 'bounce back' quickly and efficiently from a perturbation. It is considered to be both a natural property and quality which can be improved within a broad array of complex adaptive systems including critical infrastructures, ecosystems, societies and economies through good governance."
Societal resilience is not only a dynamic and relational concept but also a profoundly political one. It is a focus of the EU and, as stated in its Global Strategy (2016: 23) , the resilience deals with "the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises". Moreover, in the same document, building the "state and societal resilience to our East and South" is defined as one of the top five priorities for the EU's external action. Besides references to resilience in the context of resilient societies, states and democracies, the EU Global Strategy (2016) also comprises the resilience of critical infrastructure, networks and services and the resilience of the EU's democracies.
One important aspect of resilience is that it acknowledges uncertainty and complexity as a contemporary condition. However, it emphasizes internal capacities and capabilities as the way to deal with these problems rather than external intervention (Juncos 2017 • Political, economic and military pressure (from an external actor)
• Disturbances in critical government services
• Terrorism, radicalism and other criminality that endangers social order
• Severe disturbances in border security (including uncontrolled people movement)
• Major accidents and extreme natural phenomena
• Serious disturbances in health and welfare of the population
• Disturbances in energy supply
• Disturbances in power supply
• Disruptions in public utilities
• Disruptions in civil transportation systems and transport logistics
• Disturbances in financial and payment systems
• Disruptions in availability of public financing
• Disruptions in availability of food and water resources
• Disturbances in public information and communication systems
• Dealing with mass casualties
The list above comprises some of the most vital functions to society and is focused on contingencies. However, it does not contain all the challenges mentioned in the list of Croatia's vulnerabilities, as some of them belong to cultural (e.g. structural corruption), legal (e.g. effectiveness of the legal system) or economic (e.g. energy security) aspects. These issues are of particular importance as they may provide an exploitation opportunity for the hybrid adversary.
It is therefore important to define how societal resilience may become a means to counter hybrid threats. Some proposals, adapted from Yanakiev (2016) are given below.
• Dealing with unknown unknowns ("black swans"). This comprises the necessity to anticipate future circumstances, events or effects that are impossible to predict and plan for.
• Development of proactive government-led comprehensive approaches progressively accompanied by whole-of-society strategies aimed at managing risks and building a resilient society.
• Concentration of the resources and capabilities of different stakeholders (primarily the state's instrument of power but also that of the society, the private sector and individual citizens) to counter hybrid threats. This includes improved public-private cooperation on security and development and modernization of civilian and military capabilities.
• Development of innovative legal concepts and frameworks to address hybrid threats adequately.
• Expanding the missions of existing state institutions in the security sector (i.e. new authorities for intelligence and counterintelligence agencies and armed forces, boosting strategic communication) or creating new organizations.
Conclusion and recommendations
A hybrid adversary seeks to exploit the weaknesses of society. It is therefore important to analyse vulnerabilities across all domains that might be exploited by an opponent, including legal, policy, diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, socio-cultural and law enforcement. Such a gap analysis should also include legal vulnerabilities that could prevent the creation of an appropriate response to hybrid threats. A follow-up step is to reduce (societal) vulnerabilities and to develop joint contingency plans. Besides that, any relevant (grand) strategy should incorporate measures to reduce vulnerabilities that may be exploited by a potential hybrid adversary. The presented approach often requires political (e.g. policy) measures as well as some paradigm changes (e.g. cultural and structural adaptations). Therefore, awareness among decision-makers on the policy/strategic level should be raised that countering this type of threat and challenge requires not only different ways (strategies and concepts) and means (structures and organization), but also different qualities of an organization, be it a company (e.g. related to cyber threats), a community or a state.
Hybrid threat, as a potential, or hybrid warfare, as an act, is a complex phenomenon. It is complex as it results from the convergence and interconnection of different components which together form a more multifaceted and multidimensional threat. Complexity thus makes the traditional approach to strategic planning -which focuses exclusively on organizational interests (e.g. national values and interests) and the environment (e.g. global and regional security environment) -inadequate.
With regard to means to respond to hybrid threats, while the traditional means (conventional armed forces) may still be valid as an instrument for ensuring territorial defence, protection of sovereignty and deterrence, they need to be used in conjunction with other state instruments of power to respond adequately to hybrid threats. Besides the state instruments of power, the resilience of the whole society (e.g. societal immunity) is needed to ensure deterrence against and response to hybrid threats.
This paper analyses hybrid warfare almost exclusively through the Western perspective since the scope of the research was to enlighten the relevance and approaches to the topic for the Croatian national security strategy.
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